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Abstract
We consider the interaction between the risk of unemployment, ran-
dom house prices, consumption and savings. A critical decision is that
of reﬁnancing house purchase, up to 100% mortgages are possible. There
is also a ﬁxed transaction cost of reﬁnancing. In a CARA framework we
derive the value function for a ﬁnite horizon, the policy of reﬁnance and
the consumption function. Either there is a maximum mortgage or a zero
mortgage depending on interest rates, house prices and the transaction
cost. The consumption function is linear in wealth and in the uncertainty
caused by employment status and house prices of the future. Since there
is either 100% or 0% equity withdrawal, consumption jumps when there
is reﬁnancing.
Keywords: precautionary savings, employment risk, mortgages, hous-
ing
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
In many European countries the housing market plays a special role. Together
with pensions, housing is one of the major spending and ﬁnancial decisions
facing consumers. Some economies have a liquid rental market for housing
and an illiquid retail market; others have a negligible rental market outside
metropolitan areas but an active retail market (Chiuri and Jappelli, 2001).
Flavin and Yamashita (2003) stress that with a thin rental market, housing
decisions have to balance ﬁnancial asset portfolio considerations with the need
for housing services. This means that the typical life cycle portfolio composition
sees systematic changes in the share of housing in wealth. Much applied work
shows that house prices play a signiﬁcant role in determining many economic
variables at the aggregate level, such as consumption, savings and GDP growth
(Muellbauer and Murphy, 1997). There is also a recent literature that looks at
the collateral/buﬀer stock eﬀect of housing investment on precautionary savings.
Here the argument is that where the retail housing market is illiquid, housing
equity serves as a buﬀer stock of wealth against low probability but very bad
income shocks. Thus, housing is rarely traded but it allows a higher level of
mean consumption since if the worst income events occur there is a buﬀer stock
of wealth that can be realised (Pelizzon and Weber, 2003). This ignores the
fact that most house owner/buyers hold mortgage debt against their housing
(Campbell and Cocco, 2003) so that net housing wealth may be quite low. A
further discussion is about irrationality of the mortgage market, there is inertia
in the reﬁnancing decision. For example, in the US, where most mortgages
are at ﬁxed nominal interest rates, there is active reﬁnancing as interest rates
change (Majumdar, 2004), but in Europe this is less common (Smith and Vass,
2004).
One of the worst income events is that of unemployment. Important ques-
tions here are whether individuals build up buﬀer stocks of bond or net housing
wealth to allow adjustment to bad future employment shocks. Since one must
always live somewhere, a buﬀer stock of housing wealth is only useful if it can
be used as collateral against loans, which is predominantly executed by remort-
gaging. By contrast, with a diﬀerentiated housing stock, a consumer entering a
period of unemployment can trade down in their housing; similarly, towards the
end of life, when the remaining uncertainty about labour income is minimal1.
Households face various risks in their employment and asset decisions. Labour
income risk consists partly of shocks to the wage rate and partly of shocks to
the availability of jobs. In ﬁnancial assets there is nominal and real interest
rate uncertainty and in the case of real assets such as housing, the risk of future
house prices. Illiquid ﬁnancial assets with a long term (like mortgages) also
involve liquidity risk - to keep the house the individual must be able to keep up
repayments (Fratantoni, 2001). In addition there are trends, so that a common
assumption is of a hump-shaped mean life cycle real wage, perhaps with some
trend growth, probably some small trend growth in real house prices and a small
1It is possible that the consumer could get better equity withdrawal from trading down
(see section 7).
2positive trend in the real interest rate (Browning and Crossley, 2001). The im-
portance of these diﬀerent risks varies over the life cycle; typically for highly
geared young households, with housing debt a high proportion of wealth and
income, the liquidity risk is higher than for older households with, on average,
more diversiﬁed wealth.
Another issue in the literature is related to the degree of substitutability of
housing and ﬁnancial wealth in determining consumption. Will two households
with the same aggregate wealth, the same labour income prospects and the same
preferences follow the same consumption function if one of them has a much
higher proportion of housing wealth than the other? The empirical results here
are mixed (Hoynes and McFadden, 1994; Bostic et al. 2004; Majumdar, 2004).
The question is important since consumer spending ﬂuctuations are often seen as
an important determinant of business cycle ﬂuctuations. The main transmission
mechanism for converting changes in housing wealth into disposable resources
is the mortgage; therefore, analysing how mortgage decisions are made when
housing wealth changes is crucial.
Campbell and Cocco (2003) is a major study of the relative advantages of
ﬁxed and variable rate mortgages that is close to our concerns. They use a
constant relative risk aversion utility function with an essentially time neutral
consumer, which means that they rely on calibrated numerical simulation in-
volving grid search over both their state and control variables to derive the
optimum. This approach allows quite general assumptions about the stochastic
processes that drive house prices, interest rates and labour income. However,
they do not directly address our concerns that are about the optimal mortgage
reﬁnancing policy and the eﬀects of the combination of house price uncertainty,
imperfect capital markets and employment risk on the mortgage reﬁnancing
decision and savings.
We use a real model with time additive utility over a ﬁnite horizon with a
positive rate of time preference. The felicity function exhibits prudence. We
have employment and real house price risk and time varying wages and real
interest rates (the latter are driven by stochastic processes but are foreseen by
the individual). There are market imperfections in the mortgage market: a ﬁxed
transaction cost and the mortgage can never exceed the latest realised house
price. The mortgage is an adjustable rate mortgage taken for the remaining life
of the consumer but can be prepaid at any date, this means that we include the
eﬀects of the risk that mortgage repayments may exceed current income.
We ﬁnd that in our framework there is a simple rule for reﬁnancing: con-
sumers reﬁnance when the gain from the wedge between the mortgage rate and
the savings interest rate (which depends on the current house price and mort-
gage, if any) is suﬃciently high to cover the transaction cost. The reﬁnancing
may either involve reducing the current mortgage to zero or increasing it to its
maximum level, permitted by the imperfect capital markets. In either case it
is a bang-bang policy and the reﬁnancing decision is driven just by ﬁnancial
eﬃciency. This is a simple strong result. In addition we analyse the eﬀects
of house price uncertainty and employment risk on consumption and savings.
Generally employment risk raises precautionary savings; but future house price
3uncertainty may either raise or reduce current consumption. On the one hand,
the chance of high future house prices gives the prospect of possible high future
collateralised borrowing possibilities; on the other hand, it gives the risk of end-
ing up with a low housing asset value when meeting a spell of unemployment.
Since the optimal reﬁnancing has all or nothing features, when it is optimal to
reﬁnance, consumption will typically jump; it is like a windfall gain in wealth
that can then be optimally consumed over the remaining future.
The ﬁnancial instruments that we consider are very simple: a ﬁxed term
mortgage for up to the length of life and a one period bond. This means that,
since the individual needs a house throughout life, the only way of avoiding
large disposable wealth in the ﬁnal period of life when the house is sold is to
accumulate debts in the one period bond, which can then be paid oﬀ in the ﬁnal
period with the proceeds from the house sale. In the simulations we provide
this occurs but in several cases consumption also jumps in the last years of life.
In related papers it also occurs (Fratantoni, 2001; Campbell and Cocco, 2003,
where utility/felicity rises at the end of life).
To see how often it pays to reﬁnance and its quantitative eﬀect on con-
sumption we give some simulations mainly based on the typical hump-shaped
pattern of real wage earnings of the employed and with random but trendless
house prices. Here we ﬁnd that the extent of reﬁnancing critically depends on
the transaction cost, but, apart from this, optimal savings have the usual pat-
tern of the literature depending on the relative time preference of the consumer,
except that the reﬁnancing tends to serve as a lumpsum shock to cash-on hand
in periods subsequent to those in which it occurs. Patient consumers will tend
to produce a hump-shaped pattern of ﬁnancial assets and growing consumption.
Impatient consumers will tend to have falling consumption ﬁnanced by debt in
the ﬁrst half of life, paying it oﬀ in middle age and later life. Typically the
simulations do not exhibit hump-shaped consumption, this partly reﬂects the
eﬀect of the high value of wealth at the end of life caused by the house, perhaps
partly the parameter values used.
An interesting special case arises when consumers know that they will retire
before the end of the horizon. In this scenario individuals typically save more
than when they can work all their life, but reﬁn a n c ei ne x a c t l yt h es a m ew a y
and for the same reasons. Interestingly in later life, when retired, consumers
have growing consumption whether they are patient or impatient. An alterna-
tive simulation has wages and house prices with a positive trend increase, and
still noise in house prices. Generally the consumer uses mortgage ﬁnance more
heavily in this case, and also goes into debt in ﬁnancial assets whatever the
relation between the rate of time preference and interest rates. Foreseeing high
future income on average makes it worth borrowing in the early part of life.
The plan of the paper is to give the assumptions in section 2, derive the
overall value function explicitly in sections 3 and 4. In section 5 we analytically
derive the consumption function. The calibrated simulations are in section 6.
We then brieﬂy discuss extensions and conclude.
42 The Model Assumptions
We take a ﬁnite time horizon T of discrete time periods t. The general form of
the budget constraint without any mortgage reﬁnancing is
At+1 =( 1+rt)At + ws
t − ρtMt − ct
where ρt,r t are the mortgage and interest rate respectively and are perfectly
foreseen. Mt is the mortgage debt at the start of period t . ws
t represents labour
income and has two possible values: either the individual has a job and labour
income is the wage wt or there is no job and labour income is unemployment
beneﬁto fBt.A t are nonmortgage ﬁnancial assets at the start of period t,w h i c h
earn a one period interest rate of rt.
The mortgage is a pure bond which lasts the horizon but which can be paid
oﬀ/reﬁnanced each period. House prices e pt are random and realised at the start
of the period. There is a mortgage ﬁnancing constraint saying Mt ≤ pt−1. In
reality in the UK 100% mortgages are possible but usually only on relatively
standard property. 2In every period before the ﬁnal one, there is a chance α of
being in employment. In the ﬁnal period the individual is unemployed for sure.
Within a period t<Tthe timing is that initially there is a portfolio (At,M t)
and pt,ρ t,r t,w t are all known at the period start. Interest income is paid and
received at the start of the period. The mortgage is a debt of given face value
with a variable one period interest rate and with maturity date of up to T.
Each period consumers can reﬁnance the mortgage if they wish, repaying the
existing debt and taking out a new mortgage, again with a maturity date of
T.The reason for doing this is to alter the debt position to take account of
house price and relative real interest changes. If reﬁnancing is undertaken, the
consumer chooses a new mortgage size Mt+1 ≤ pt and has to pay a transaction
cost of k. Then consumption ct is chosen, next employment status is realised
for period t and ﬁnally assets to carry forward into the next period At+1 are
determined within the budget constraint. This means that assets initially bear
all the eﬀe c t so fs h o c k si ne m p l o y m e n t ,b u tt h i so n l ya ﬀects the current period
and is insigniﬁcant over the lifetime3. Allowing for reﬁnancing the mortgage,
the budget constraint in periods before the ﬁnal one becomes
As
t+1 =( 1+rt)At + ws
t +( 1− ρt)Mt+1 − Mt − ct
where ws
t is either wt or Bt. The carry forward of assets is random depending on
the employment state at t -w h e t h e rws
t = wt,B t. Note also that as viewed from
earlier periods Mt+1 is random, since it depends on the realisation of random
house prices through the constraint Mt+1 ≤ pt. Without reﬁnance Mt+1 = Mt
2In addition there is usually a current income multiplier so that the constraint might read
Mt ≤ min[pt,µw t]. This could include the case in which, when unemployed, no reﬁnancing is
possible. See section 7.
3This is unimportant and arises from the deﬁnition of the period, but it simpliﬁes the
analysis to use this timing. You may think of shopping on Saturday and being paid the
subsequent Friday.
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t+1 =( 1+rt)At + ws
t − ρtMt − ct
The consumer enters the ﬁnal period with mortgage debt MT, ﬁnancial assets
AT and with a realised house price of pT. At the period start the consumer sells
the house (but arranges to continue living in it for the duration of the period4),
redeems any mortgage and consumes all the known cash on hand.




Within a period preferences have a CARA form and depend only on consump-
tion:
u(ct)=1− exp(−bct)
That is, there is a zero utility of housing and an inelastic labour supply. If hous-
ing is indivisible and homogeneous, then omitting it from the utility function is
without loss of generality - everyone has to have a roof over their head. Ignoring
the disutility of work is more serious and is based really on simplicity; we could
include it assuming that jobs have ﬁxed hours of work. A similar point arises
about ignoring the socio-demographic eﬀects, especially those of children. In
a formal sense we could easily incorporate them into the theoretical analysis,
but the real question is their empirical importance. CARA preferences have
two advantages: they allow us to get further with analytical solution without
having to approximate Euler equations, and they still exhibit prudence. Much
4There is a small market in which equity in the house can be realised in the last years of
life eg by selling the house to a ﬁnancial institution and buying back an option to live in it
until death but this is not very well developed.
5It would be very simple to add a bequest motive, especially if the utility of bequests also
has an exponential form.
6of the literature works with isoelastic felicity, this generally requires approxima-
tion to get solutions and there is some evidence (Gouricnchas and Parker, 2002)
that the error involved can be substantial; on the other hand, since isoelastic
preferences have unbounded marginal utility at zero consumption, it generally
serves to keep cash on hand positive for sure and so almost acts like a liquidity
constraint. With CARA, marginal utility is ﬁnite at zero consumption, so we
may expect to see the consumer actively go into debt. However the lifetime
budget constraint prevents him dying in debt.
3 Value Function
Based on Merton (1992), and Berloﬀa and Simmons (2003), we conjecture that
the value function at t is
Vt(At,M t,p t)=αt − βt exp[−bδt ((1 + rt)At − Mt)]
In the ﬁnal period there is no issue of reﬁnancing for T +1, the house is sold,
any outstanding mortgage is redeemed (in which case the transaction cost has
to be paid) and all remaining ﬁnancial assets are consumed
cT =( 1 + rt)AT + pT + ws
T − MT − kT if MT > 0
=( 1 + rt)AT + pT + ws
T if MT =0
We also assume that in the last period for sure the individual is unemployed so
that ws
T = BT. This is without loss of generality since consumption is deter-
mined prior to knowledge of employment status and then in the last period it
would have to be reined back to a level that will prove feasible if it turns out
that the individual is unemployed in that period, as it is impossible to die in
debt. We can also think of this as retirement in the ﬁnal period. For the last
period the value function has the above form. with
αT =1
βT =e x p ( −bBT)exp(−bpT) if MT =0
βT =e x p ( −bBT)exp(−b(pT − k)) if MT > 0
δT =1
Moreover, since there is no employment risk in the last period, expectations
only have to be taken over the house price:
ET−1βT =e x p ( −bBT)E exp(−b(pT − k)) if MT > 0
=e x p ( −bBT)E exp(−bpT) if MT =0
For earlier periods the form of the value function depends on whether it is op-
timal to undertake reﬁnancing. We derive the value functions at t with and
without reﬁnancing and then compare them to determine the optimal reﬁnanc-
ing decision.




t+1 =( 1+rt)At+(1− ρt)Mt+1−Mt−ct+ws
t −k}
Deﬁne the expected utility term corresponding to next periods labour income
as
Wt =[ αexp(−bδt+1 (1 + rt+1)wt)+(1−α)exp(−bδt+1 (1 + rt+1)Bt)]1/[1+δt+1(1+rt+1)]
and the "discounted future interest rate" as
∆t =
δt+1 (1 + rt+1)
1+δt+1 (1 + rt+1)
The appendix shows that conditional on the reﬁnancing decision, the value
function with reﬁnancing is
V R
t (At)=1 + φαt+1 − [φ(Eβt+1)δt+1 (1 + rt+1)]1/[1+δt+1(1+rt+1)]
·exp(−b∆t[(1 + rt)At − Mt])Wt
·exp(−b∆t[{(1 − ρt)Mt+1 − k} − Mt+1/(1 + rt+1)])/∆t
At the start of t, given that remortgaging takes place, the mortgage reﬁ-
nancing decision is to choose Mt+1 to maximise V R
t (At) within the constraint
Mt+1 ≤ pt.D e ﬁning λt =( 1− ρt)−1/(1 + rt+1), this is equivalent to minimis-
ing
exp[−b∆tMt+1λt]
The decision rule is then:
Mt+1 = pt if λt > 0
Mt+1 =0 if λt < 0
The individual always chooses a corner solution for mortgage reﬁnance - either
zero or 100%. The choice is made comparing the interest and mortgage rates
that set the relative cost of ﬁnancing the housing debt via borrowing in bonds
or in a mortgage. Integrating this into the value function
V R
t (At)=1 + φαt+1 − [φ(Eβt+1)δt+1 (1 + rt+1)]1/[1+δt+1(1+rt+1)] ·
·exp(−b∆t[(1 + rt)At − Mt])Wt · exp(−b∆t[max[λtpt,0] − k])/∆t
Similar arguments show that without reﬁnancing
V NR
t (At)=m a x
ct
{u(ct)+φ[αt+1 − (Eβt+1)(E exp(−bδt+1(1 + rt+1)ws
t))
·exp[−bδt+1 ((1 + rt+1){(1 + rt)At − ρtMt − ct} − Mt)]]}
=1 + φαt+1 − [φ(Eβt+1)δt+1 (1 + rt+1)]1/[1+δt+1(1+rt+1)]
·exp(−b∆t[(1 + rt)At − Mt]) · exp(−b∆tλtMt)Wt/∆t
8This then gives us a condition for reﬁnancing to occur. At t the individual
chooses to reﬁnance the mortgage if V R
t (At) >VNR
t (At),i . e .i f :
exp[−b∆t (pt max((λt,0) − k)] < exp[−b∆tMtλt]
The reﬁnancing condition is then:
pt max(λt,0) − k − Mtλt > 0
Notice that this is independent of current ﬁnancial assets, future employment
or house price uncertainty: it is a matter of pure ﬁnancial eﬃciency. Without
restrictions on Mt, if the mortgage rate were above the savings rate the con-
sumer could make unbounded wealth gains by borrowing inﬁnitely in At and
"investing" in Mt; similarly, if r>ρ . The constraint 0 ≤ Mt ≤ pt−1 limits the
size of these gains. Even though there are transaction costs, current mortgage
decisions are not aﬀected by the risk that in the future house prices may be high
or low, nor by the risk of being unemployed. This is partly because decisions
can be reversed next period, but it is also partly due to the CARA form of pref-
erences with which the value function separates out current disposable wealth
from future uncertainty. It follows that the eﬀect of risk in either house prices
or employment is all on consumption and savings.
If λt > 0 (the mortgage interest rate at t is relatively low with respect to
rt+1), in terms of the debt service costs it would pay to reﬁnance to the highest
extent possible by setting Mt+1 = pt so long as the interest gain on the sum
involved more than covers the transaction cost of reﬁnancing, i.e.
pt − Mt >
k
λt
This occurs when the diﬀerence between the house price and the present mort-
gage is high and so is the interest diﬀerential between bonds and mortgages.
This is the case of maximum equity withdrawal.
On the other hand, if λt < 0 (the mortgage interest rate at t is relatively
high with respect to rt+1), there would be a debt costs service advantage from
replacing the mortgage by bond ﬁnance, which will be undertaken so long as the
cost saving at least covers the transaction cost. Thus the consumer reﬁnances
the mortgage and chooses Mt+1 =0when
k<M t
1 − (1 − ρt)(1 + rt+1)
1+rt+1
= −Mtλt
i.e. when the cost of reﬁnancing the mortgage is not too high.
We can summarise the possible remortgage actions at time t as
9λt > 0 Mt =0 λtpt >k Mt+1 = pt
λt > 0 Mt =0 λtpt <k Mt+1 =0
λt > 0 Mt = pt−s λtpt >λ tpt−s + k Mt+1 = pt
λt > 0 Mt = pt−s λtpt <λ tpt−s + k Mt+1 = pt−1
λt < 0 Mt =0 Mt+1 =0
λt < 0 Mt = pt−s λtpt−s + k<0 Mt+1 =0
λt < 0 Mt = pt−s λtpt−s + k>0 Mt+1 = pt−1
Notice that, if starting from a position with a zero mortgage there is a
run of periods in each of which λt < 0, then there will be inactivity and zero
outstanding mortgages in each of these periods. To move from this to a positive
mortgage requires both that λt should switch sign and that, when it does,
the expected ﬁnancial gain from remortgaging outweighs the transaction cost.
Similarly, the current mortgage at t may have been taken out at a level of pt−s
s periods ago, since when it has not been optimal to reﬁnance.
4 Overall Value Function
The overall value function is the larger of V R
t (At,M t) and V NR
t (At,M t),w h i c h
can be written as
Vt(At,M t,p t)=1 + φαt+1 − [φ(Eβt+1)δt+1 (1 + rt+1)]1/[1+δt+1(1+rt+1)]
·exp(−b∆t[(1 + rt)At − Mt])
·exp(−b∆t max{λtMt,max[λtpt,0] − k})Wt/∆t
= αt − βt exp[−bδt ((1 + rt)At − Mt)]
This generates recurrence relations for the unknown functions
αt =1 + φαt+1
δt = ∆t =
δt+1 (1 + rt+1)
1+δt+1 (1 + rt+1)
βt =[ φ(Eβt+1)δt+1 (1 + rt+1)]1/[1+δt+1(1+rt+1)]
·exp(−b
δt+1 (1 + rt+1)
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(1 + rT)(1 + rT−1)(1 + rT−2)
1+( 1+rT)+( 1+rT)(1 + rT−1)+( 1+rT)(1 + rT−1)(1 + rT−2)
The recurrence relation in β, which captures the eﬀect of future house prices
and employment uncertainty, requires some careful analysis.
4.1 Eβt+1 : The Eﬀects of Future House Price Uncertainty
The eﬀects of future house price uncertainty at time t work through the ex-
pression Eβt+1. Since we have assumed that any trend in pt is not stochastic
Et+1βt+2 is not a function of pt+1 so at time t t h er a n d o mt e r mi nβt+1 is
Ft+1 =e x p ( −bδt+1 max[λt+1Mt+1,p t+1 max{λt+1,0} − k])
=e x p ( −bδt+1Gt+1)
where
Gt+1 = λt+1Mt+1 if λt+1 < 0 and λt+1Mt+1 > −k
= −k if λt+1 < 0 and λt+1Mt+1 < −k
= λt+1Mt+1 if λt+1 > 0 and pt+1λt+1 − k<λ t+1Mt+1 (3)
= pt+1λt+1 − k if λt+1 > 0 and pt+1λt+1 − k>λ t+1Mt+1 (4)
We want to compute EFt+1 over pt+1.
If λt+1 < 0, either the consumer does not wish to reﬁnance, or reﬁnances to
carry forward a zero mortgage. In either event Gt+1 and the conditions are not
random, so EFt+1 = Ft+1.
If λt+1 > 0 it is more complex. The third case (3) holds when house prices
are such that the consumer potentially wishes to reﬁnance to the maximum
permissible extent but the savings from doing so will not cover the transaction
cost of reﬁnance. This occurs when
pt+1 <M t+1 +
k
λt+1
and in the fourth case (4) which holds for pt+1 above this, the gains from taking
out a new maximum mortgage do cover the transaction cost..
11Hence when λt+1 > 0,i fw ed e ﬁne the probability that the maximum re-
mortgage will not cover the transaction cost by γt =P r ( pt+1 <M t+1 + k
λt+1):














> pt+1 then γt =1
That is we have two boundary cases where either house prices are always so low
that a maximum remortgage will not cover the transaction cost, or where they








this then gives us the relations in table 2.
Thus, there are only eﬀects of immediate future house price uncertainty on
t h ec u r r e n tv a l u ef u n c t i o ni fλt+1 > 0. In fact, extending this argument, the
distribution of house prices at any future data τ only aﬀects the current value
function for those periods in which λτ > 0. Since there is no intertemporal



































The future EFs only include elements of the distribution of house prices for
cases in which their corresponding future λ is positive. Using this together with
12Table 2
13the expression for βt

































Note that there is an eﬀect on βt of the time to go to the horizon, the
longer the remaining future, the higher the number of terms in the product for
β since there are more future nodes. Therefore, in earlier periods β tends to be
higher which reﬂects the eﬀect of the greater amount of uncertainty remaining.
Conversely towards the end of life, there is little remaining uncertainty and so
on these grounds less of a need for precautionary savings.
Combining elements of Table 2 with (2),(??)a n d
Vt(At,M t,p t)=αt − βt exp[−bδt ((1 + rt)At − Mt)]
gives the form of the overall value function. At t the initial mortgage Mt and
house price pt determine the mortgage of t +1 . Together with λt+1 and house
prices at t +1 , the form of Eβt+1 and of the value function at t is determined.
However, these also depend on Eβt+2, which itself depends inter alia on the
mortgage at t+2. Hence a combination of the history and elements of the whole
future determine the current value function.
5 Consumption
As usual with CARA preferences consumption with or without reﬁnancing is
basically linear in disposable wealth, but there are some complications.
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6 If the probability of unemployment was either history dependent or uncertain, then so
long as it is independent of house prices there is little impact on the expression for β:t e r m s
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1
b(1 + δt+1 (1 + rt+1))
ln(Wt)+δt (pt max(λt,0) − k)











δt+1 (1 + rt+1)
¢
+ δt ((1 + rt)At − Mt)
−
1
b(1 + δt+1 (1 + rt+1))
ln(Wt)+δtλtMt
The main features of consumption are that:
(i) Both with and without reﬁnancing, the eﬀect of future period employment
risk and house price uncertainty is to shift the intercept of the consumption
function by an amount that depends on the degree of risk aversion. Since it




δt+1 (1 + rt+1) < 1, the future uncertainty in house
prices may actually increase rather than reduce consumption. We know that
for sure δt+1 (1 + rt+1) < 1 so long as rt+1 < 0.5 and φ<1 but the relation
of φδt+1 (1 + rt+1) to Eβt+1 is unclear so that the total eﬀect is ambiguous.
Uncertain future house prices give the opportunity of high prices and so the
chance of high future equity withdrawal, reducing the need for current buﬀer
stock savings against future employment uncertainty. If future house prices are
certain then the expression for Eβt+1 changes when λt+1 > 0. We can gauge the
eﬀect of this by comparing Eβt+1 with its value when house prices are constant
at their mean Ept+1:
Case 1
If λt+1 > 0 and p
t+1λt+1−k>M t+1λt+1,t h e nEpt+1λt+1−k>M t+1λt+1.
Hence, with certain house prices:
EFc
t+1 = Fc
t+1 =e x p ( −bδt+1(λt+1Ept+1 − k))
as opposed to
EFt+1 = E exp(−bδt+1[pt+1λt+1 − k])
>From Jensen’s inequality it follows that EFt+1 = E exp(−x) < exp(−Ex)=
EFc
t+1 since exp(−x) is concave.
cC − cU =
1








where cC is consumption when future house prices are certain and cU is con-
sumption under uncertainty. Here future house prices are for sure going to
15allow a higher mortgage and an interest cost saving, so eﬀectively the house
price uncertainty raises future wealth unambiguously.
Case 2
If λt+1 > 0 and Ept+1λt+1 − k>M t+1λt+1 then
EFc
t+1 = Fc
t+1 =e x p ( −bδt+1(λt+1Ept+1 − k))
as opposed to
EFt+1 =e x p ( −bδt+1λt+1Mt+1)γt




Again from the Jensen’s inequality it follows that E exp(−x) < exp(−Ex) since
exp(−x) is concave. And since Ept+1λt+1 − k>M t+1λt+1 we know that
exp(−bδt+1λt+1Mt+1) > exp(−bδt+1[λt+1Ept+1 − k]). So the overall compar-
ison is ambiguous: there is a risk that future house prices are low, constraining
the reﬁnancing possibilities.
Case 3
On the other hand if λt+1 > 0 and Ept+1λt+1 − k<M t+1λt+1 then
EFc
t+1 = Fc





















cC − cU =
1








In other words, when with certain future house prices no reﬁnancing is under-
taken (Ept+1λt+1 − k<M t+1λt+1), precautionary savings are negative.
Summing up, in each of these cases housing is acting like an intertemporal
buﬀe rs t o c ki nw e a l t hw i t he ﬀects on the current level of savings. Knowing that
in the future there will be a redeemable asset (though of uncertain value), the
consumer can aﬀord to borrow today. In addition the composition of wealth
between net housing wealth (pt − Mt) and At has an impact on consumption.
The marginal propensity to consume out of wealth is δt (1 + rt) but out of a
reduction of the current mortgage is δt(1 − λt).
16In addition there is an eﬀect on consumption of the remaining length of the
horizon. We have seen that Eβt tends to fall through time. This serves to yield
consumption growth through time ceteris paribus. As time passes there is less
remaining uncertainty and so less of a need for precautionary savings.
(ii) Consumption is linear in net wealth (1 + rt)At −Mt but is nonlinear in
expected current period labour income. The latter is essentially an artifact of
the assumed within period timing where consumption has to be chosen before
the employment status of the current period is realised. In fact this labour
income risk reduces consumption: suppose that income were certain at the level
wt = αwt +( 1− αt)Bt. Then since the exponential is a convex function and
δ>0
αexp(−bδt+1(1+rt+1)wt)+(1−α)exp(−bδt+1(1+rt+1)Bt) < exp(−bδt+1(1+rt+1)wt)
a n dt h e ns i n c eln() is an increasing function, consumption is depressed by the
labour income uncertainty. This argument also applies to the future labour
income risk terms in Eβt+1, Wt+s. If labour income of some future period were
certain at its mean level this would increase the term in Wt+s which ceteris
paribus would raise Eβt+1 and tend to raise current consumption.
(iii) When it is optimal to reﬁnance, the eﬀect of reﬁnancing on current
consumption is unambiguously non-negative. This is current equity withdrawal.
However, with no reﬁnancing the current mortgage state may increase, reduce
or leave consumption unchanged. It will reduce consumption when λt < 0 but
the cost saving from reducing the current mortgage Mt to zero does not cover
the transaction cost of doing so.
(iv) The current mortgage interest rate only has eﬀects via λt. When λt <
0 an increase in the mortgage rate may cause a switch from no reﬁnance to
reducing the current positive mortgage to zero, which will generate a step jump
in consumption. If the mortgage is already zero, an increase in the current
mortgage rate will have a zero eﬀect on consumption. When λt > 0 and pt >M t
there is scope for increasing the mortgage so long as the interest gain covers
the transaction cost. A fall in the current mortgage rate increases the chance
of reﬁnancing and so may cause a switch from no reﬁnancing of the current
mortgage (which may be zero) to reﬁnancing to the maximum extent possible
which causes a jump in consumption. Only a part of the current wealth change
arising from remortgaging is consumed in the current period (the coeﬃcient δ)
and part of the wealth change is used to smooth future consumption.
(v) The current savings interest rate has obvious income eﬀects on consump-
tion. First, there is a consumption increasing eﬀect through raising capital in-
come when the consumer has positive ﬁnancial assets, but a decreasing eﬀect
through raising the debt service cost when assets are negative. Future savings
rates and especially the savings rate of the next period have much more complex
eﬀects: directly through altering the slope of the consumption function in most
variables, indirectly through varying λt and through aﬀecting the discounting
terms in Eβt+1. If at t the foreseen rt+s increases (s>0) all the terms in δτ
for t ≤ τ<sare increased. In particular if s =1then δt+1 is unaﬀected and so
17the term 1/(1+δt+1(1+rt+1)) falls and so the marginal propensity to consume
out of labour income expected for this period falls.
(vi) As the degree of risk aversion rises, the absolute value of the intercept
of the consumption function falls in any period and so between any two periods
there is less variability in consumption. In particular there are smaller jumps
in consumption when reﬁnancing occurs.
6 Calibrated Simulations
We study the optimal consumption and mortgage choices of an individual with
a 40 period horizon. In every period the chance of being in employment is
α =0 .90, in which case annual earnings are wt.
6.1 Case 1: Hump Shaped Earnings and Trendless House
Prices
In this case we assume a hump-shaped proﬁle of wages:
wt =0 .5 · exp(−((t − 20)/20)2)
so that they peak at t =2 0and start and end at about 0.2.
If the individual is jobless, she gets unemployment beneﬁts, which are 50% of
the wage in the ﬁrst period and then slightly grow at a constant rate g =0 .015.
The interest rate is held constant (r =0 .025) and the mortgage rate is
deﬁned by the process:
ρt =1 .1 · r + εt where εt ∼ U(−.27,.5)
This is without loss of generality, since in the mortgage reﬁnancing decision
what really matters is the ﬂuctuation of ρt around r (and not the fact that r is
time-varying). We assume also that there is no trend in house prices:
pt ∼ U(5B1,10B1)
This is based on the rule of thumb that generally the house price income ratio
is around 3 and so the house price/unemployment beneﬁt ratio is around 6 or
7. We assume that in the ﬁrst period the consumer takes out a mortgage equal
to the house price.
In ﬁgures 2 to 5 we plot the realized wage (which is either wt or Bt depending
on the employment status), house prices, λt and the mortgage function. In the
benchmark case the cost of reﬁnancing the mortgage is k =0 .1B1, the discount
factor is φ =1 /1.15 and the coeﬃcient of risk aversion is b =1 .637
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Fig 6: Patient consumer
T h es h a peo ft h el i f e - c y c l ep r o ﬁle of consumption and assets is consistent with
the general result (Deaton, 1991) that patient consumers are natural lenders, not
borrowers. In the presence of uncertainty, they save early in life and decumulate
later; initial consumption is low, but grows rapidly during the life-cycle. In
our simulations, the individual experiences four spells of unemployment, one of
which lasts for two periods. In response to these unexpected changes in income,
consumption jumps discontinuously. The fall in last period consumption with
these particular realisations depends on the fact that the realised house price at
T is relatively low.
Since reﬁnancing the mortgage involves ﬁxed transaction costs, consumers
do not make smooth adjustments. The higher the transaction costs, the less
frequent the reﬁnancing. We now consider two alternative values of the reﬁ-
nancing cost: in the ﬁrst case k =0 .4B1, in the second k =0 .05B1.A sF i g u r e
(7) shows, the mortgage choice is very sensitive to the level of k.Aﬁxed trans-
action cost equal to the 40% of the initial annual beneﬁti ss u ﬃcient to prevent
the consumer from any reﬁnancing.
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Fig 8: Mortgage size (k =0 .05B1)
A crucial assumption in our simulation concerns the discount factor. Life-
cycle models usually assume φ =1 /(1 + r) or in the case of interest rate un-
certainty E(1 + r)=1 /φ; in this case there is no trend in consumption and
investors are more likely to borrow when income is known to be growing than
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Fig 10: Composition of wealth
For a time neutral consumer the life cycle composition of wealth is shown in
Fig 10
Here we deﬁne total wealth as the sum of ﬁnancial assets and net housing
wealth at the start of the period (At +pt −Mt). Fluctuations in housing wealth
are caused by either reﬁnancing or shocks in house prices. Switching total debt
between the ﬁnancial asset and the mortgage is apparent in Fig 11, but there
are periods in which ﬁnancial assets and net housing wealth move in the same
21direction. Net housing wealth is largely trendless, and the lifecycle eﬀect of
hump shaped wages is captured mainly in ﬁnancial assets. Interestingly total
wealth rises over the second half of life until the last few periods even though
the consumer is in debt in ﬁnancial assets for these late periods. The perfect
ﬁnancial capital market is allowing the consumer to borrow against the value of
the house at the end of the horizon.
Finally, for impatient individuals (φ =1 /1.04) optimal consumption starts
at a high level and decreases rapidly during the life-cycle; to carry out their con-
sumption plans, these investors borrow large amount of money early in life. This
reﬂects the lack of borrowing restrictions in our model, whose only constraint
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Fig 11: Impatient consumer
6.1.1 Case 1.1: Foreseen Compulsory Retirement
In this case we assume that the individual must retire at t =3 0after which his
non-capital income is just the beneﬁt. The wage peaks at t =1 5and starts at
w1 ' 0.2. The other assumptions are maintained.
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Fig 14: Composition of wealth
For the time neutral consumer the composition of wealth is shown in Fig
14. As with humpshaped wages, net housing wealth is broadly trendless and
the biggest jumps in ﬁnancial assets are matched by simultaneous reverse big
jumps in net housing wealth as the consumer switches the source of ﬁnance
for housing debt. There is a strong life cycle eﬀect in ﬁnancial assets: initial
borrowing followed by accumulation of ﬁnancial assets which are used during
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Fig 16: Impatient consumer
The lack of labour income in later life makes both the patient and the time
neutral consumer (φ =1 /(1+r)) save suﬃciently to keep ﬁnancial assets nearly
always positive. The growth rate of consumption for these consumers is gen-
erally positive. The impatient consumer saves more but still has falling con-
sumption (Fig 16). The compulsory retirement has no eﬀect on the reﬁnancing
decision so these consumers reﬁnance in exactly the same way as consumers who
can keep working until t =4 0 .
6.2 Case 2: Growing Wages and House Prices
In this case wages grow from an initial level of unity at a smooth rate of 5%
and house prices at time t are uniformly distributed on a time varying interval
[3wt,6wt].








Fig 17: Growing wages






















Fig 19: λt =1− ρt − 1/(1 + rt+1)








Fig 20: Mortgage reﬁnancing
The growth in real house prices and wages has an eﬀe c to nt h et i m ep r o ﬁle of
consumption that dominates time preference eﬀects, consequently we give only
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Fig 22: Composition of wealth
For the time neutral consumer in this case the composition and evolution of
wealth are shown in Fig 22.
The growth in real house prices causes heteroscedasticity in net housing
wealth since the consumer is switching between mortgages of zero and of a
maximum size that is growing over time. Since both wages and house prices
are growing the consumer anticipates that on average he will have high cash on
hand in later life, and reacts by consistently borrowing in ﬁnancial assets until
about midlife when debts are repaid out of high labour incomes.
The individual reﬁnances more frequently than with trendless wages, pre-
sumably because of the induced trend and heteroscedasticity in house prices: at
25later dates house prices are more variable, and high house price realisations al-
low a relatively large mortgage on reﬁnancing, which can then anticipate future
house price and earnings growth. The individual borrows also in the ﬁnancial
asset, but ﬁnancial debts show quite high variability as the proceeds of a remort-
gage are partly used to pay oﬀ some of them. The rapid jump in consumption
at the end of the plan is due to a high realisation of the ﬁnal house price, which
not only covers repayment of ﬁnancial debt and the mortgage, but also allows
a ﬁnal spree.
7E x t e n s i o n s
Our approach suggests some obvious areas for future research and has various
special assumptions whose force we try to evaluate here.
First we have assumed no liquidity constraints in the ﬁnancial asset: so long
a st h el i f e t i m eb u d g e tc o n s t r a i n ti sr e s p ected consumers can borrow as much as
they wish. This is important in making the key determinant of the reﬁnancing
decision the relative interest rate advantages of borrowing against the house
or against future wealth (including future labour earnings and the future value
of the house). We can think of this as using the house value as collateral for
borrowing in ﬁnancial assets - since the lifetime budget constraint is satisﬁed,
there is no default risk and, if during life, ﬁnancial assets become negative, these
debts are just rolled forward to the next period. An alternative would be to
impose the constraint At ≥ 0 in which case the reﬁnancing decision becomes
much less transparent - it has to take account of the fact that remortgaging now
inﬂuences the chance with which next period the consumer may end up being
liquidity constrained e.g. if they lose employment.
Second generally the amount that can be borrowed on a mortgage is limited
not only by the house value but also by the current income level. The rationale
for this seems to be on debt service cost grounds. In the UK usually this
multiplier limits the mortgage to no more than three or four times income.
Our simulations nearly all respect this constraint so the simulated results will
still represent optimal behaviour even with this income limit. Figure 23 shows
the income/mortgage ratio in the ﬁrst simulated case as against the ratios of









Fig. 23: Mortgage-income ratio
More generally we could quite easily incorporate the constraint into the
analytical framework, it raises nothing new conceptually but makes the algebra
more complicated. Given that the individual wishes to reﬁnance in period t, the
new mortgage decision would be8
Mt+1 =m i n [ pt,µw t−1] if λt > 0
=0 if λt < 0
Again reﬁnancing will be optimal if there is a ﬁnancial advantage:
min[pt,µw t−1]max[λt,0] − kt − Mtλt > 0
Putting these together, the term in mortgage activity in the overall value
function would become
min{exp(−b∆tλtMt),exp(−b∆t(1+rt+1)[max[λt min[pt,µw t−1],0]−k)}Wt/∆t








exp(−bδt max{λtMt,max[λt min[pt,µw t−1],0]−k})Wt/δt
Then following the methods of section 4.1, the time path of β can be deduced.
An obvious extension would be to allow for more than one type of house,
e.g. a large expensive house with price pt and a small cheaper house with price
8Since labour uncome for t is unknown at the time of reﬁnancing, the income constraint
works on past labour income.
27πt, each of these prices are uncertain but for sure always cheaper πt <p t.T h e n
consumers could trade down from large to small houses and vice versa. We
might then expect to see systematic trading down close to retirement. In terms
of housing decisions at t there are three choices: retain the existing house and
mortgage; retain the existing house but reﬁnance; change house and reﬁnance.
It makes sense to add a second transaction cost kh
t which is incurred when
changing house (in addition to the reﬁnancing transaction cost). The eﬀect is
to add a third branch to the value function and the overall value function is
then the maximum over the three branches. If we keep the other assumptions
maintained (especially no liquidity constraints), the reﬁnancing decision will
have the same form, once any house purchase/sale has been decided. Again all
uncertainty will be channelled through β, the value function will have a similar
structure and the recurrence relation for β, (1) will become
βt =[ φ(Eβt+1)δt+1 (1 + rt+1)]1/[1+δt+1(1+rt+1)]
·exp(−b∆t max{pt − πt − kh
t +( πt max((λt,0) − k),λ tMt,max[λtpt,0] − k})Wt/∆t
Furthermore, in the compulsory retirement case we could make the date of
retirement uncertain. This is similar to dropping the perfect foresight assump-
tion on wages and has signiﬁcant eﬀects (see Berloﬀa and Simmons, 2003, and
below).
The main special assumptions that we have made are:
• CARA preferences depending only on consumption and independent of
housing or leisure or socio-demographics.
A problem with CARA is that optimally consumption may turn out to be
negative since marginal utility is ﬁnite at zero consumption. That never
happens in our simulations. We could make utility vary with housing and
leisure-in the context of a model with a single indivisible house type, the
former adds little, but the latter would be interesting and, although most
of the structure of the value function, the reﬁnancing decision and con-
sumption will remain unchanged, there will be some additional preference
eﬀects (see Berloﬀa and Simmons, 2003).
• Perfect foresight of unemployment beneﬁt, wage and interest rates.
This is an important simpliﬁcation with potentially large implications. If
interest rates are uncertain then the consumer has a real portfolio choice,
not just a choice driven by choosing the asset with the highest return. We
might then expect to get some diversiﬁcation of the portfolio depending
on the covariance between the interest rates. In addition the covariance
between interest rates and house prices will play a role.
Uncertainty in the real wage when employed can readily be incorporated so
long as it is uncorrelated with house prices and with the chance of having
a job. The value function, the reﬁnancing decision and consumption will
have a similar functional structure where the expected labour income term
28Wt becomes
Wt = αE exp(−bδt+1 (1 + rt+1)ws
t)+( 1− α)exp(−bδt+1 (1 + rt+1)Bt)
If there is correlation between house prices and wages it is more complex.
Another assumption we have made is that the real house price is station-
ary, we could relax this, allowing for a random walk with drift and get
similar results.
• A chance of being jobless that is constant (and foreseen) through time.
It would be easy to allow the chance of unemployment to be time depen-
dent - essentially it is just a notational change, the eﬀect will be absorbed
into Wt, so all the results will carry through.
• Omission of the impact of the tax system.
The treatment of interest income and payments, capital gains on housing
and of implicit user services of owned housing diﬀers between tax systems,
so it is important to interpret these variables as post-tax.
• As i n g l eo n ep e r i o dﬁnancial asset with a perfect capital market.
The biggest omission here is the role of voluntary or involuntary contri-
butions to pension schemes.Pension wealth can be deﬁned by either the
value of accumulated contributions to date or by the estimated pension
income that will accrue at maturity. With the former approach and using
the Family Resources Survey, Warren et al. (2001) ﬁnd that individual
median wealth was about £63k which decomposed into median wealths of
pensions £26k, ﬁnancial wealth £1k and housing wealth £24k. The pen-
sion wealth divided into about 39% in state pensions, 53% in occupational
pensions and only 8% in "discretionary" pensions. This asset structure
accords with that found by others where liquid or risky ﬁnancial assets
are an insigniﬁcant proportion of individual wealth. Warren et al. also
ﬁnd signiﬁcant age, household composition and cohort eﬀects, although
o v e rt h el i f ec y c l et h ec h a n g ei nt h es h a r eo fﬁnancial wealth is not very
sizeable-the wealthiest group (couples of above retirement age) had me-
dian wealth of £165k and the highest level of ﬁnancial wealth but even
here the median value for ﬁnancial wealth was only £6k. Pension wealth
is clearly important and serves both to remove some eﬀects of uncertain
date of death and to act as a buﬀer against asset shocks, e.g. falling real
house prices late in life. Using the projected beneﬁts approach and a co-
hort approach, Attanasio and Rohwedder (2003) ﬁnd substantial age and
cohort diﬀerences in the level of pension wealth.
A further factor is that in reality there are wedges between the saving rate
and the borrowing rate in bond type ﬁnance. Including this will aﬀect the
reﬁnancing decision.
298C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper uses a framework which allows us to analytically solve for the value
function and the optimal lifecycle policies for consumption, saving in ﬁnancial
assets and mortgage debt when a ﬁnitely lived, risk averse individual faces em-
ployment risk and uncertainty of house prices. This gives the advantage of being
able to derive general propositions as opposed to speciﬁc simulation results with-
out resorting to approximations which may have substantial inaccuracy. The
ﬁnancial asset market is perfect and up to 100% variable rate mortgages are
allowed. Using CARA preferences and the assumption that house prices do not
have stochastic trends while interest rates are certain and wages are foreseen
facilitate explicit solution. However, the form of value function and optimal pol-
icy that we ﬁnd is generally robust to relaxation of these special assumptions,
similar results would follow if we had more constraints on available mortgages,
uncertain wages, preferences depending not only on consumption but also on
housing services, more than one type of house. One main result in all these
cases is that there is a single "suﬃcient statistic" through which the eﬀects of
uncertainty on the value function and the optimal policies are channelled. This
is due to the CARA form of preferences.
In terms of detail, we ﬁnd that consumption is linear in wealth with an
intercept that depends on future employment and house price risk, and a slope
that depends on risk aversion and interest rates. Depending on the interest
rate diﬀerential and the mean of future house prices, house price uncertainty
may raise or reduce consumption in a period. Housing wealth and mortgage
ﬁnance impact on consumption so that in periods when it is optimal to reﬁnance
consumption jumps corresponding to equity withdrawal. Therefore, sometimes
consumption tracks cash on hand and is not fully smoothed. In other periods
there is an ambiguous eﬀect of mortgage debt on consumption. We perform
some simulations which illustrate these properties. Broadly, when real wages
are trendless, the trend in consumption reﬂects the degree of patience of the
consumer so that although we mainly use hump shaped wages, we do not ﬁnd
hump shaped consumption. However if real wage growth is expected then even
if the consumer is patient, it is optimal to borrow in early periods against
later high labour income. In one set of simulations we explore the eﬀects of a
period of retirement on consumption and ﬁnancial decisions. Generally there is
accumulation of the ﬁnancial asset during working life to ﬁnance retirement.
The eﬀects of housing wealth on consumption and saving/borrowing deci-
sions primarily work through the mortgage. Consequently, the analysis of the
reﬁnancing of mortgages is important to understand how housing wealth can
act as a buﬀer stock against bad shocks, e.g. in employment. We ﬁnd that
without liquidity constraints and with foreseeable interest rates, the reﬁnancing
decision is driven by ﬁnancial eﬃciency considerations. The individual will re-
ﬁnance to the maximum extent possible in those periods in which the ﬁnancial
gains from doing so cover the transaction cost. Hence we should expect to see
individuals with either zero mortgages or 100% mortgages. The ﬁnancial gains
from reﬁnance are used partly to ﬁnance present and partly future consumption.
30Since the optimal mortgage is always at a limiting value of zero or the maximum
permissible, any smoothing of consumption is achieved through varying the ﬁ-
nancial asset/debt position. Consequently, life-cycle eﬀects or trends in labour
income are translated into an optimal consumption path via nonlinear trend
type variation in ﬁnancial assets. This means that during life the composition
of wealth varies. On the other hand, housing does act as a buﬀer stock in the
sense that knowing that in the last period the house will have for sure a value
high in relation to labour income and an even higher mean value, the consumer
can borrow earlier in life in ﬁnancial assets.
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A Appendix
A.1 Value Function
At T all available wealth is consumed and no mortgage interest is paid since no
new mortgage debt is contracted so
0=( 1+rt)AT + pT − MT − cT + BT − k
In the last period the value function is:
VT =1 − exp(−b((1 + rT)AT − MT))exp(−bBT)exp(−bpT) if MT =0
=1 − exp(−b((1 + rT)AT − MT))exp(−bBT)exp(−b(pT − k)) if MT > 0
This result is obtained simply substituting the budget constraint at T into
the instantaneous CARA utility function.
So at T
αT =1
βT =e x p ( −bBT)exp(−bpT) if MT =0
βT =e x p ( −bBT)exp(−b(pT − k)) if MT > 0
δT =1
32In any period before the ﬁnal one, with reﬁnancing the Bellman’s equation
says that ct is determined to :
max
ct
{u(ct)+φEVt+1(At+1)|At+1 =( 1+rt)At+(1− ρt)Mt+1−Mt−ct+ws
t −k}
That is equivalent to:
max
ct
{u(ct)+φE(αt+1 − βt+1 exp[−bδt+1 ((1 + rt+1)At+1 − Mt+1)])





1 − exp(−bct)+φ{αt+1 − E(βt+1 exp[−bδt+1 (1 + rt+1){(1 + rt)At
+(1− ρt)Mt+1 − Mt − ct + ws
t − k} − Mt+1])}
Since we are assuming that the risk of unemployment is foreseen and is
independent of the uncertain house prices:
E[βt+1 exp(−bδt+1 (1 + rt+1)ws
t)]
= Eβt+1[αexp(−bδt+1 (1 + rt+1)wt)+( 1− α)exp(−bδt+1 (1 + rt+1)Bt)]
The ﬁrst order condition gives:
exp(−bct)=[ φ(Eβt+1)δt+1 (1 + rt+1)] · exp[bδt+1 (1 + rt+1)ct]
·exp[−bδt+1 ((1 + rt+1)[(1+rt)At +( 1− ρt)Mt+1 − Mt − k] − Mt+1)]
·[αexp(−bδt+1 (1 + rt+1)wt)+( 1− α)exp(−bδt+1 (1 + rt+1)Bt)]
=[ φ(Eβt+1)δt+1 (1 + rt+1)] · exp(−bδt+1 (1 + rt+1)[(1+rt)At − Mt])
·exp[bδt+1 (1 + rt+1)ct] · exp(−bδt+1[(1 + rt+1){(1 − ρt)Mt+1 − k} − Mt+1])
·[αexp(−bδt+1 (1 + rt+1)wt)+( 1− α)exp(−bδt+1 (1 + rt+1)Bt)]
Hence:
exp(−bct)=[ φ(Eβt+1)δt+1 (1 + rt+1)]1/[1+δt+1(1+rt+1)]
· exp(−b
δt+1 (1 + rt+1)
1+δt+1 (1 + rt+1)
[(1 + rt)At − Mt])
· [αexp(−bδt+1 (1 + rt+1)wt)+( 1− α)exp(−bδt+1 (1 + rt+1)Bt)]1/[1+δt+1(1+rt+1)]
· exp(−b
δt+1
1+δt+1 (1 + rt+1)
[(1 + rt+1){(1 − ρt)Mt+1 − k} − Mt+1])
33and
exp[bδt+1 (1 + rt+1)ct]=[ φ(Eβt+1)δt+1 (1 + rt+1)]−δt+1(1+rt+1)/[1+δt+1(1+rt+1)]
· exp(b
(δt+1 (1 + rt+1))2
1+δt+1 (1 + rt+1)




t+1 (1 + rt+1)
1+δt+1 (1 + rt+1)
[(1 + rt+1){(1 − ρt)Mt+1 − k} − Mt+1])




So conditional on the reﬁnancing decision, taking expectations over the employ-
ment status at t the value function with reﬁnancing is
V R
t (At)=1+φαt+1 − [φ(Eβt+1)δt+1 (1 + rt+1)]1/[1+δt+1(1+rt+1)]
· exp(−b
δt+1 (1 + rt+1)
1+δt+1 (1 + rt+1)
[(1 + rt)At − Mt])
· [αexp(−bδt+1 (1 + rt+1)wt)+( 1− α)exp(−bδt+1 (1 + rt+1)Bt)]1/[1+δt+1(1+rt+1)]
· exp(−b
δt+1 (1 + rt+1)
1+δt+1 (1 + rt+1)
[{(1 − ρt)Mt+1 − k} − Mt+1/(1 + rt+1)])
· [
1+δt+1 (1 + rt+1)
δt+1 (1 + rt+1)
]
34